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A viable space traffic management program faces a great barrier caused by the ever-increasing 
number and variety of orbiting objects ranging in size from a few microns to several meters. 
Although several international agreements to limit the growth rate of orbital debris are in 
place, the risk of damage and destruction to active satellites is continually rising. The urgency 
of this situation was highlighted by the 2007 Chinese ASAT test and the collision of Iridium 
and Cosmos satellites in 2009. Although many debris removal techniques have been posited 
none have been implemented. Unless a space debris reduction program is undertaken in the 
near future, continued access to space and use of space for applications and exploration may 
be extremely compromised. The growing collision threat will continue to complicate any 
future space traffic management program. Space junk is a man-made, growing threat to space-
based applications such as communications, weather forecasting and Earth observation among 
many others. Space commerce is expanding and as this industry grows the need for an 
effective traffic management system will become critical to commercial growth and 
exploration of space. An integrated approach to resolving the debris issues through a carefully 
designed research program is described. Such a program could facilitate resolution of orbital 
debris impediments to a controlled space environment.          
 
I. Introduction 
Those familiar with air traffic management architectures understand the constraints of 
aircraft flying in the atmosphere, vehicle dynamics and command and control techniques. 
Unfortunately, compared to air traffic space traffic has many more degrees of freedom and much 
less control capability. Add to this the completely uncontrolled nature of space debris and the 
reality that most debris objects cannot be tracked and motion cannot be accurately measured or 
simulated.1 In fact, orbiting debris is a product of negligence. Over the first 50 years of space 
flight, mission plans ended with the completion of in-space operations. Satellites were shut down 
and left in their orbits, subject to natural influences. Little thought was given to any collateral 
effects of objects “adrift” in space, because “space” was thought of as “big.” An analogy might 
be the ocean disposal of waste items, where junk gets lost in the vastness of the seas, either by 
sinking to the bottom or by simply drifting with ocean currents. By contrast, a “drifting” satellite 
remnant in low orbit is travelling at a speed in excess of 7.3 km/sec (16,300 mph). Since orbiting 
objects can travel in all directions, collisions between satellites and debris can occur at speeds of 
over 14.6 km/sec (32,600 mph). 
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Of the suspected hundreds-of-thousands of debris objects, only about 22,000 are four inches 
or larger in size and can be tracked.2 The majority of junk items remain beyond current tracking 
capabilities, but are just as dangerous in terms of causing significant damage to operating 
spacecraft. Just as weather affects our daily lives, so does Earth’s orbiting junkyard. The 
detrimental effects of space junk grow worse each year, putting our daily lives and national 
infrastructures increasingly at risk as our communications, science and security networks rely 
ever more heavily on the interconnected system of satellites orbiting the skies. Yet, a space 
traffic management system may have to deal with possible debris interference. 
While we understand weather and have learned techniques to deal with it, the impact and 
disposition of orbital debris are not fully understood. Unlike weather, space junk is man-made 
and will significantly hinder the nation’s future economy and security. It is a growing threat to 
space-based communications, weather forecasting, banking processes, scientific exploration, 
Earth observation and future space tourism. Space commerce is growing, and as this industry 
expands the need for an effective traffic management system will become critical to commercial 
growth and exploitation of space.  
At the moment, there are no programs in place to deal with orbital debris, even though new 
satellites continue to be launched at a rate of over 100 each year. Most of these launches will 
contribute to the already-large orbital debris population. With over 60 countries operating in 
space, the exponentially growing problem of orbital debris will take international collaborations 
and partnerships to conceive and develop innovative solutions and strategies as part of a 
worldwide space traffic management architecture.  
 
II. The Debris Problem 
The past excesses and neglect associated with the unabated launch of satellites that use 
space for both earth-bound applications and as a dumping ground for discarded upper stages, old 
satellites, and a large variety of miscellaneous pieces and parts from thousands of once-active 
high-tech space machinery now leave us with one of the most complex challenges since the 
beginning of the Space Age. The debris has accumulated to the point where operational satellite 
traffic lanes are not only getting clogged with expired satellites and space trash, but are 
approaching “gridlock.” When referring to terrestrial traffic, gridlock means the movement of 
vehicles cannot continue.2 When referring to space flight, this means space is inaccessible to all 
prospective users. Although space gridlock is still years or decades away, it is clearly in our 
future if nothing is done to “mitigate” the situation. Neglect of space has gone on so long that 
“mitigation” in this case means several significant measures must be taken to avoid future 
dumping in space.  
Some steps have already been implemented that will delay gridlock.3 Shielding has been 
added to some spacecraft to assist in the survival of collisions with very small pieces of debris 
that number in the millions. Most space-faring nations have agreed to remove satellites from 
high risk zones when they reach their end-of-life, and most launch vehicle upper stages now 
purge propellant tanks in order to prevent later explosions due to material degradation. In some 
cases, maneuvering to avoid a collision is appropriate. Nevertheless, these precautions only delay 
the onset on gridlock because there is still sufficient ongoing debris production through 
collisions and spacecraft breakups to sustain the continued buildup of debris. Thus, a focused 
debris reduction program may well be needed in the future, possibly within the next decade. The 
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long research, planning and development cycles for space systems dictates that we begin serious 
debris reduction research and technology development in the near term. 
 
III. The Spectrum of Issues 
The number of organizations using the near-Earth space environment for applications 
ranging from exploration to exploitation and national security is impressive and continues to 
grow. Safety is a prime concern for both equipment and personnel. For government operators, 
the control of risk is mandatory. For commercial operators, operational efficiency and favorable 
cost/benefit considerations are paramount. In recent years several government agencies have 
been studying space traffic management, i.e., regulation of orbital traffic.4 To date, there has 
been little control over what is placed into orbit. Each space-faring nation is able to operate 
independently and with little, if any, international coordination or cooperation. This is quite 
different from the international air traffic management system that allows the free-flow of airline 
traffic over a major part of the world. Every airliner uses designated airspace that is protected 
during its flight by air traffic controllers. Most airliners travel at comparable speeds and 
collisions are avoided by horizontal and vertical separation standards. This ensures that mid-air 
collisions are, indeed, rare. 
The flight paths of low-orbiting satellites, on the other hand, are not coordinated and the 
selection of orbits is not centrally controlled by any international agency. This situation has 
evolved, at least in part, because near-Earth space is thought to be “big.” In fact, it is big. But, 
the concept of “big” is only valid as long as the density of things in a given region is extremely 
low. As the number of satellites and debris objects continue to grow the concept of “big” begins 
to shrink. In addition, objects in low orbits are all travelling at speeds in excess of 7.3 km/sec. 
Unlike aircraft, satellite and object separations are not controlled. The continued increase of 
traffic in these orbits leads one to quickly conclude that space traffic management may soon be 
necessary in order to sustain the viability of many current space applications. However, the 
management of space traffic presents a daunting challenge. At the moment, we lack much of the 
required technology, there is little international cooperation or collaboration regarding space 
traffic planning and the political environment is not amenable to creating an all-inclusive space 
traffic control architecture. Consider the physical separation of air traffic into commercial and 
military categories with completely different flight rules. While satellites may be restricted to 
low-latitude flight paths, they must overfly all longitudes as they circle the earth. In fact, some of 
the most popular orbits are shared by civil, commercial and military satellites. 
The situation is further complicated because we lack the ability to accurately track and 
predict the precise movement of satellites and large debris objects. As mentioned, the location 
and movement of most debris objects are not known. We do not even know sizes, shapes or 
materials of most debris objects. None of the orbiting junk is controllable, and very few active 
satellites can maneuver responsively to avoid possible collisions. Finally, many satellites are 
used for national security and their exact orbits are often classified. Yet, all classes of spacecraft 
fly in similar orbits. The issues of national sovereignty and sensitivity lead to some nasty legal 
and political arguments. It is easy to conclude that any meaningful space traffic control 
architecture may be decades away. 
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IV. Dealing with Orbiting Debris 
The space community has worked hard to mitigate excessive proliferation of debris by 
establishing rules for spacecraft manufacturers and operators that help minimize the creation of 
new debris. However, there is no system or program in place to remove or clean up near-earth 
orbits and there are no serious programs addressing the long-term environmental control of 
space. Orbital debris is a threat to operating spacecraft, human spaceflight and critical 
communications systems and the level of this threat is building exponentially.  
Satellite operators have been fortunate so far. Debris has been little more than a nuisance 
(except for the Iridium/Cosmos incident) and has created minimal damage. In other words, the 
threat has been “acceptable” and therefore, the high cost of solving any debris issues has not 
been justified. Since a solution has not been needed, actual cleanup costs have not been fully 
investigated. However, it is likely that at some point in the future the debris threat will require a 
solution. Many options have been proposed but none, so far, appear to be affordable and/or 
effective. 
While many aspects of orbital debris mitigation and remediation have been addressed 
through concept proposals and studies, few, if any, organizations have ventured toward an 
integrated, multidisciplinary and international approach to all aspects of the technical and non-
technical issues. This is understandable because most debris-related efforts are narrowly focused 
on various specific aspects of the problem. Faculty researchers at the University of Maryland 
realized this shortcoming in debris resolution activities. As a result, the Center for Orbital Debris 
Education and Research (CODER)5 was conceived and is currently ramping-up during its first 
year of operation. 
Indications are that CODER will quickly develop into an international collaborative center of 
education and research that addresses solutions to the space trash problem in an integrated and 
all-inclusive manner. Issues being addressed include technologies and systems, relevant space 
policies, economics of solutions, legal and treaty aspects and sociological issues. A long-term 
goal of the center is to help in the development of policies, laws and space systems that will lead 
to the efficient remediation and control of space environmental pollutants.  
A university-based center allows a maximum level of transparency and inclusion for all those 
interested in studying the problems and conceiving solutions through education and research. As 
the center seeks international collaboration and inclusiveness it envisions multiple sources of 
domestic and international support. CODER may quickly become an international clearing house 
for research and educational programs that address the various orbital debris issues and it will be 
a focal point for idea interchange through conferences, meetings and outreach programs.  
CODER will fulfill its mission through the development and implementation of innovative 
educational and research activities in support of the center goals. It is already fostering the 
collaboration of academic, governmental and commercial entities, both within the US and 
internationally. An initial core interdisciplinary team has been established to spearhead early 
research activities into each dimension of the orbital debris problem. CODER has begun to 
solicit research and development funds across multiple agencies and organizations in support of 
the center’s mission. An initial economic plan is in place as a guide for achieving both near-term 
and long-term center objectives. One of the primary center objectives is to contribute to and to 
support the development of international policies governing the mitigation and remediation of 
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orbital debris. One significant advantage of an academic research center is easy dissemination 
and distribution of knowledge and findings to the international community.  
 
V. General Issues of Space Traffic Management  
There is little doubt that the number of government, commercial and academic operations in 
space will continue to increase. A primary concern is always safe robotic and human operations 
for space systems and space-based services. While collision risks are still probabilistically low, 
the risk is real and growing. The level of concern for space system operators is slowly rising and 
the threat must be addressed on a continual basis.   
A minimum requirement for effective space traffic management is timely, accurate position 
data on all space objects in a controlled traffic region.  Traditional two-line orbital element sets 
and processes that were used during the Cold War are not adequate for precision conjunction 
analysis. If debris avoidance is to be successful, real-time precise updates on position and 
movement of derelict objects are essential for safe flight in low-earth orbits. Furthermore, future 
satellites that operate in this region will need quick-response maneuvering capabilities that most 
current space systems do not carry.  
Even if there were no debris, the implementation of space traffic management procedures and 
operations may require that future satellites operating in low-earth orbits will need maneuvering 
capabilities not common on current systems. In addition, some form of space-born technology 
that complies with yet-to-be-established international protocols should ensure clear traffic lanes 
among the several national systems that share the space. Devices that are analogous to aircraft 
avoidance equipment may alert approaching space traffic and autonomously issue maneuver 
commands. However, closing speeds in space can be 30 times higher than possible for aircraft. 
Thus, close-approach warnings must be issued much earlier than for aircraft. Typically, two 
approaching aircraft can respond to a warning in a few seconds. Two approaching satellites may 
require at least 30 minutes, or more, to execute a maneuver after a warning is received. Clearly, a 
number of new technologies, procedures and design approaches are going to be needed to 
achieve space traffic management objectives. 
It appears reasonable to assume a first step in developing a space traffic management system 
is to address the issue of managing the large number of passive derelict objects that could 
eventually jam the traffic lanes. 
 
VI. Potential Technology Needs for Debris Management  
 It was pointed out earlier that the first requirement in managing a derelict space object is to 
know its exact position and motion at any time and to be able to project its movement in time 
and space. At the beginning of the space age, some 50 years ago, there was little need for this 
level of accuracy. As space systems evolved, it became important to send telemetry data to the 
ground and to send operational commands from the ground. During the Cold War the US and 
USSR built ground stations, ships and aircraft to perform telemetry, tracking, and command 
(TT&C) functions.   
Management of the space volume continues to rely on Cold War technology heritage and 
civil and commercial capabilities. The USAF detects, tracks, identifies and catalogs man-made 
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orbiting objects through use of the Space Surveillance Network (SSN). To observe the 20,000+ 
objects in orbit, the SSN utilizes ground-based, electro-optical and radar sensors. In recent years, 
the USAF has introduced space-based methods of tracking orbiting objects. One approach is the 
Space Based Space Surveillance (SBSS)6 system. Originally planned to be a constellation, SBSS 
1, the first of the SBSS satellites, was placed into low-earth orbit on September 25, 2010. This 
spacecraft has a 30.5-cm telescope on a two-axis gimbal with a 2.4-megapixel image sensor and 
has a projected mission duration of five-and-a-half years. Earlier this year the Air Force 
announced another space-based system, the Geosynchronous Space Situational Awareness 
Program (GSSAP). The use of GSSAP7 satellites will lead to significant improvements in space 
object surveillance at geosynchronous altitudes, because they will operate in the near-
geosynchronous region, providing a clear, unobstructed vantage point for viewing objects in that 
region. These satellites will carry electro-optical imaging sensors, while drifting around the 
geosynchronous belt, allowing them to locate and inspect many objects with relative ease.  
From a space traffic management point of view, it is unfortunate that the population of 
nonfunctional orbiting objects far outnumbers operational assets. Debris is responsible for a high 
stress condition on the SSN in terms of number, distribution and even size. In reality, the current 
surveillance architecture has several shortcomings: 
- Inability to monitor all objects all the time 
- Insufficient timeliness and availability of orbital data 
- Lack of awareness of planned maneuvers 
- Orbital data errors 
- Powered flight problems 
- Little standardization of data types  
- Operational errors or system anomalies that introduce uncertainties 
The international nature of the space domain is an important factor. In the future, space 
vehicles will continue to be flown by a multitude of entities including civil space agencies, 
militaries, intelligence organizations, commercial companies, academic institutions and perhaps 
even private individuals. 
Space-faring nations have been working together for years to develop guidelines and 
regulations to minimize the creation of space debris. Arguably, these efforts have been 
successful in reducing the rate of growth of debris.  Unfortunately, these rules are not 
enforceable. Furthermore, the United Nations’ Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space 
(COPUOS) is focused on promoting the use of space and increasing awareness of space issues, 
but is insufficiently funded to adequately perform even this limited mission. 
 
VII. Learning from the Air Domain 
 Space traffic management systems will likely evolve from some simple concepts. Take, for 
example, the evolution of navigation aids for civil aviation in the US. This may provide some 
insight for the future of space traffic control. The first radio navigation aids emerged around 
1930. Pilots then used these to assist in en-route navigation and landing approaches. Safe 
separation of aircraft depended on pilots reporting their locations relative to known landmarks.  
Controllers at airport control towers had to keep notes on aircraft positions and used these to 
clear aircraft for takeoffs and landings.  Radar emerged after World War II and provided a way 
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to maintain safe separation of aircraft. The tracking of aircraft in the National Airspace System 
(NAS) by radar remains the standard, some 60 years after its introduction in the 1950s. 
In 1994, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) integrated the Global Positioning 
System (GPS) as part of the US air traffic system.8 Pilots use GPS as a navigation aid, but air 
traffic controllers still depend on radar to manage safe aircraft spacing from the ground. In the 
early years of GPS usage accuracy, availability and reliability of the system were not sufficient 
for use as the primary navigation aid for aircraft landing. However, in 1998 the FAA initiated the 
development of two GPS augmentation systems: WAAS (Wide Area Augmentation System) and 
LAAS (Local Area Augmentation System). In 2000, military-level GPS accuracy was made 
broadly available, providing navigation accuracy to 15 meters.  Today, WAAS is operational and 
provides accuracy to 3 meters over most of North America. 
LAAS9 is an all-weather aircraft landing system based on real-time differential correction of 
GPS signals. Reference receivers located around the airport send data to a central location at the 
airport. These data are used to formulate a correction message, which is then transmitted to users 
via a data link. A receiver on the aircraft uses this information to correct GPS signals, which then 
provides information for precision approaches. The first installation at Newark Liberty 
International Airport achieved operational approval in September 2012. A second system was 
installed at Houston Intercontinental Airport and received operational approval in April 2013. 
Operational approval of several more systems is expected shortly. 
The recent introduction of ADS-B (Automatic Dependent Surveillance–Broadcast)9 extends 
the application of GPS from aircraft navigation to air traffic control. Aircraft equipped with 
ADS-B automatically broadcast a message containing the aircraft’s current location, direction 
and speed. This new technology introduces the possibility of an air traffic management approach 
that is independent of ground-based surveillance radar. ADS-B accuracy exceeds the 
performance of current surveillance radars, but such a system must have assured availability and 
reliability. The adoption of radar, and then, GPS in aviation, first for navigation and then for air 
traffic control may provide insights that can help to formulate approaches to space traffic 
management. 
 
VIII. Fundamental Physical Limitations of Space Traffic Management 
Consider the fundamental differences between air traffic management and space traffic 
management from a physical point of view. Airliners typically travel at speeds near 0.25 km/sec 
(550 mph) and are easily separated because they travel in two-dimensional planes that are 
defined by altitude. In-plane separation is accomplished by defined airways and air traffic 
controller instructions. Navigation is easily accomplished with GPS and other devices. Aircraft 
can easily maneuver to change course. In space, satellites travel roughly 30 times faster than 
airplanes. They travel in circular or elliptical paths. Most satellites cannot maneuver at will and 
closing speeds can be as high as 14.6 km/sec. Satellite tracking accuracies are not sufficient 
enough to predict collisions ahead of events. Thus, response times for avoidance maneuvers, if 
possible, are extremely short. Propellant expenditures for such maneuvers are prohibitively high. 
With today’s technology the only way to ensure safe flight is to assign orbits to users of the near-
earth region that are essentially free of debris. 
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Unfortunately, most orbits of choice are dictated by naturally induced advantages.10 For 
example, sun-synchronous orbits are ideal for earth observation and surveillance missions. Such 
orbits all have similar altitudes and high inclinations. Furthermore, all such orbits are in planes 
that cross each other. The result is highly congested traffic over polar regions of the Earth. 
Compared to equatorial regions, collision probabilities between satellites go up dramatically near 
the poles. To further complicate the situation, almost every country that flies earth observation 
and surveillance satellites has multiple spacecraft flying in sun-synchronous orbits. None of 
these orbits are actively controlled or separated. The only reason there have not been more 
collisions in these orbits is that the number of operational and expired satellites is not yet 
sufficient to “jam” the space. 
Early space traffic management architectures will likely ignore travel to and from orbit and 
focus just on in-orbit traffic. Once in-orbit traffic comes under management, it may be time to 
integrate air and space traffic into one system. By that time, air and space vehicles may operate 
interchangeably, assuming reusable space launch vehicles come of age.    
 
IX. Mitigating the Future 
The objective of an active debris reduction program must be limited to establishing an 
acceptable level of collision risk for active satellites.4 This can be interpreted as selectively 
reducing debris in certain size categories and in specified orbital zones that correspond to 
increased risks to operating satellites. An acceptable level of risk must be established by 
international consensus of a majority of space-faring nations. This, in turn, may lead to the 
establishment of an international body that oversees debris collision risk levels and regulation of 
orbital usage. All, or most, space-faring nations would have to agree to abide by the decisions of 
the body. Assuming the political and treaty issues can be ironed out, the actual debris reduction 
process can proceed. 
Over the past four decades a number of debris reduction ideas have been set forth. All of 
these have a few things in common. They tend to be complex and expensive. A key parameter in 
collecting debris seems to be the size of the debris pieces. We know that space debris sizes range 
from microns to several meters. Based on many studies of returned satellite parts, low earth 
orbits appear to contain up to millions of debris pieces in the size range from microns to one 
centimeter. In the size range from one to 10 cm (4 in.) there appear to be tens of thousands of 
objects. Since objects of 10 cm or more in size can be individually tracked, we know there are 
currently more than 20,000 large orbiting debris pieces.  
Another key parameter in selecting orbital regions from which to extract debris seems to be 
altitude. This assumes that the debris of interest travels in circular orbits that have altitudes close 
to those of operating satellites. As it turns out, there are only a few popular orbital altitudes. 
Other parameters of importance are inclination and right ascension, the combination of which 
establishes the orbital plane of motion.10 In cases where debris pieces are in orbits with similar 
altitudes to those of operational satellites, collision probabilities tend to be high.  
There are a number of candidate removal technologies for which investment may be 
appropriate.11 Starting with small debris collection for objects of size below 10 cm, technologies 
that are needed include special materials that can survive hypervelocity impacts such that debris 
pieces can be absorbed, or at least slowed, without creating more debris.  
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Large debris object removal will require the use of highly maneuverable satellites that can 
rendezvous with large debris objects. In each case the debris would be captured and stowed for 
de-orbit later, or a retro-pack would be attached to effect individual reentry. Technology studies 
to determine optimum mission operations must be carried out to make the best use of limited 
maneuverability due to propellant capacity limitations. Since there may be a large number of 
such spacecraft operating in close proximity, some kind of space traffic control will be essential 
to avoid collisions among the collection vehicles. 
  
X. Conclusions 
 Clearly, space traffic management represents a totally new paradigm that will use some of 
the technologies and processes of air traffic management, but will require significant new and 
innovative approaches to operating in the space environment. Even if orbit management can be 
accomplished, given the complex nature of space flight, there is the persistent issue of debris 
interference. As yet, there is no way to manage or control individual or collections of debris 
objects that clutter desired “space-ways.” One approach may be to ignore the debris threat and 
proceed without controlling debris. Another approach would be to address the debris problem 
and try to clean up space. A third approach option might be to avoid the high-density debris 
regions and reinvent how space is used. In other words, current, desired orbits would be 
abandoned and all new satellites would be placed in low-density debris regions of near-earth 
space. From an economic aspect, this last option may eventually prove the most cost-effective. 
While the first option may prove initially workable, as the debris builds, the threat level will 
become unacceptable. The second option seems attractive, but the cost of cleanup may prove too 
excessive. Research activities at CODER will address all of these options. 
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